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ABSTRACT
AI intensive systems that operate upon user data face the challenge
of balancing data utility with privacy concerns. We propose the idea
and present the prototype of an open-source tool called Privacy
Utility Trade-off (PUT) Workbench which seeks to aid software
practitioners to take such crucial decisions.We pick a simple privacy
model that doesn’t require any background knowledge in Data
Science and show how even that can achieve significant results
over standard and real-life datasets. The tool and the source code
is made freely available for extensions and usage.
KEYWORDS
Privacy Engineering, Artificial Intelligence, Software Engineering
1 INTRODUCTION
The recent advancements in Machine Learning techniques has
brought AI experts and Software Practitioners on the same page.
There is however a dearth of tools specially designed for building
AI intensive systems. Such tools would be conceptually different
from the conventional IDEs since they’ll primarily focus on models,
instead of programs or modules. Also, a greater amount of time
would be spent on fine-tuning existing models and finding the right
parameters to a learning algorithm, instead of building exhaustive
test suites to test handwritten code. Another important difference
would be that instead of using a binary logic in evaluation of the
models (e.g. a test case that either passes or fails), we’ll need to
have mechanisms to deal with probabilities (e.g. a Classification
Accuracy of 89.2%). This provides enough motivation to come up
with novel ideas about newer tools, dealing with problems that
arise in systems dealing with these paradigms.
1.1 Privacy-Utility Trade-off
The starting point of any Machine Learning activity includes col-
lecting or acquiring a significant quantity of data, the more, the
merrier. More often than not, this data belongs to individuals who
are protected by legal guidelines such as EU’s GDPR[28], putting
additional tasks on software providers to ensure that they do not
violate their privacy. The utility of a learning algorithm depends
on its ability to “find correlations” among the provided attributes.
However, not all correlations may be desirable, as they may lead to
revealing the identity of individuals who were assured that their
data would be sanitised via anonymisation before use. An example
of how this can be done from medical records, in conjunction with
a voter list, is shown in [31]. In any case, anonymising the data,
or any other similar activity performed to achieve higher levels of
privacy, usually involve “breaking correlations” that can lead to
user identification. The exact correlations that need to be preserved
or broken depend on the actual use-case. In essence, any Machine
Learning activity, when applied in a real-world software system,
needs to achieve a trade-off between privacy and utility. A tool that
allows a software practitioner to evaluate custom privacy scenarios
against their datasets can help achieve a near optimal solution on
this virtual trade-off scale.
1.2 Envisioned Users
The users who we envision to pay attention to such a tool are
software practitioners who are working on a new AI-intensive
system or those who are tasked with ensuring that a similar existing
system meet certain privacy guidelines. For instance, the GDPR[28]
compliance date of May 25, 2018 forced many providers to send
revised privacy notices to their users as they’ll be liable for legal
action if they do not meet the regulation’s requirements beyond the
deadline. We can expect that in future, more similar guidelines will
be put in place, with which the software providers will need to abide.
One particular challenge that hampers adoption of sophisticated
privacy techniques is that more often than not, it’ll require an expert
in the field of Data Science to understand the nuances of complex
correlations and befuddling statistical metrices. A typical software
practitioner need not necessarily have the expected skill-set to deal
with this scenario. Our primary goal is to build a tool that doesn’t
require upfront knowledge of these concepts. The initial version
uses a model that doesn’t involve any extra metrices than what the
practitioner may have already seen.
2 THE SIMPLE PRIVACY MODEL
To build the initial version of the tool, we’ve used a model that is
relatively simple and intuitive. The model is based on the Privacy
as the Default Setting principle[9], specifically, relating to the FIPs
Collection limitation and Data minimization[9]. In simple terms, if
we don’t keep something with us, we need not worry about it being
stolen or exposed.
Take the example of a system that recommends products for a
user on an e-commerce website. Assume that the website stores
many attributes relating to its users. For instance, the time they last
visited the site, the number of products they clicked on, the number
of times they pressed the “Back” button, etc. This dataset is then
used by a Recommender component to show users with relevant
products. Let us say the utility of the Recommender is measured
in its prediction accuracy, i.e. the average percentage of instances
where the user clicked on the recommended product.
Assume that the dataset contained n attributes, and m rows.
Assume that the Recommender achieved an accuracy of x% with
this dataset. Now consider a case when we randomly remove half of
the attributes (andmay be some of the rows too) from the dataset, i.e.
we come up with a dataset that is a partition of the original dataset.
Assume that we fed this dataset to the same Recommender, and it
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Figure 1: The Methodology of PUTWorkbench Tool
achieved an accuracy of y%. Let us concentrate on the pessimistic
case where this reduction in the size of the dataset hampered the
utility of the Recommender, i.e. y < x . What if the difference (y−x)
is not substantial? What if we are “ok” to lay off some percentage
of utility, in exchange for a scenario where we store much less user
information than we already do?
The Simple Privacy Model is based on this trade-off phenome-
non. Based on a particular use-case, a team of Practitioners might
actually choose a point where the achieved utility balances out the
achieved privacy from the business perspective. Clearly, this model
is simple enough to understand, without looking up a Statistics
cheat-sheet. We choose this model to implement the first iteration
of our tool since it is easy to understand.
2.1 Core Parameters
The model has the following core parameters:
Partition Size:- The number of attributes to pick out of the original
dataset. If there are n attributes1 in the dataset, partition size is an
integer between 1 and n, both inclusive. Another way to provide
this number is on a relative floating scale between −1.0 and 1.0,
where −1.0 corresponds to a partition size of 1, and 1.0 corresponds
to a partition size of n. On this scale, 0 means ceil(n/2). This scale
is called PUTNumber scale, where PUTNumber stands for “Privacy
Utility Trade-off Number” which maps to a unique Partition Size.
Learning Objective:- The purpose for which the dataset will be
used. For the initial versions of the tool, we’ve included a small set
of Classification techniques[17] as Learning Objectives.
Privacy Exceptions:- A known set of attribute sets which when put
together, pose a higher risk to privacy (because they can induce un-
desirable correlations). Any partition that has a privacy exception,
will not be considered by the tool.
Utility Exceptions:- A knows set of attribute sets which when put
together, provide higher levels of utility (because they can induce
desirable correlations). Any partition that has a utility exception,
may be considered at higher priority by the tool, in cases where it
cannot consider all possible combinations.
The Partition Size and Learning Objectives are required param-
eters, while the exceptions are optional. It may be noted that for
partitions which contain at least one privacy exception as well
as one or more utility exceptions, privacy exceptions take prece-
dence (i.e. such a partition is not considered by the tool). In essence,
while privacy exceptions are “bindings”, utility exceptions are mere
“suggestions”, which may or may not be accepted by the tool.
1Wheneverwe say attributes, we exclude the “class” attribute, unless explicitly specified
2.2 Tool-Specific Parameters
The possible number of partitions of size k , for a dataset with n
attributes is nCk . Even for moderately high values of n and k , the
number may easily be in millions. Also, number of rows in a dataset
can range from 1 to any arbitrarily large number. To make the tool
computationally practical, we added some additional parameters:
Vertical Expense:- A floating point number between 0 and 1.0, in-
structing what proportion of the overall possible partitions shall
the tool consider. A Vertical Expense of 0.25 means, “try only 25%
of all possible combinations”.
Horizontal Expense:- A floating point number between 0 and 1.0,
instructing what proportion of the overall rows shall be part of any
given partition. A Horizontal Expense of 0.10 means, “put only 10%
of total rows in any partition”.
Generation Method:- Suggests a way to generate the Attribute-sets.
Random Generation method generates sets in a random fashion.
Dictionary Generation method generates them systematically in a
dictionary order2.
There are some other lesser important parameters too in the tool
which are meant for fine-tuning that we omit here. The default
value for the two expenses is 1.0. By default, the generation takes
place in Dictionary Order.
3 METHODOLOGY
Figure 1 shows a pictorial overview of the tool. The overall method-
ology can be summarized as:
(1) Runs a set of validity checks over the supplied parameters. For
instance, it checks that the dataset has a “nominal” (and not
“numeric”) class attribute.
(2) Applies any filtering options over the dataset, if requested. For
instance, removal of rows with missing values, or filling them
with mean or mode.
(3) Decides upon the Attribute-set Generation Method. If the par-
titions to generate are fairly high, using the Random Method
is generally a better option. The default method is Dictionary
Method. The actual number of partitions to generate roughly
equals “v times nCk ”, where v is the Vertical Expense, n is the
total number of attributes in the dataset, and k is the Partition
Size.
(4) Any Partitions containing a Privacy Exception are not consid-
ered by the tool any further. If v was less than 1.0, and some
Partitions needed to be ignored, the one having Utility Excep-
tions are sparred the axe, to whatever extent possible.
2Dictionary order looks like this -> {1,2,3}, {1,2,4} ... {1,2,n}, {2,3,4}, {2,3,5} ...
2
Figure 2: The Analysis Tab of PUTWorkbench Tool
(5) For each Attribute-set, a Partition of the dataset is created by
including some or all rows from the original dataset, keeping
only those attributes, which are in the said Attribute-set. The
number of rows included in any partition roughly equals “h
timesm”, wherem is the total number of rows in the dataset.
These rows are randomly selected from the original dataset.
(6) For each Partition, a Classification task is forked, using the
requested technique. All the metrics produced by the task, such
as Accuracy, False Positive Rate, Area under ROC Curve etc.
are recorded.
(7) A Result file is prepared keeping all the above collected statistics.
In the GUI version of the tool, a tab for analysing these results
is shown, with multiple filtering options.
At the core, the aim is to suggest the user with a subset of the
attributes in the original dataset, which can provide significant
utility for the selected Classification activity.
4 TOOL
The tool comes in two forms, one with a Command-Line Interface
(CLI) and another with a GUI. The tool’s package also contains
two auxiliary helper tools. The tool is built using maven[1] and is
available as a public repository[35] under the MIT license[14]. The
Downloads section of the repository provides zipped versions for
Windows and Linux platforms, along with a packaged, JAR version.
There is also a short User Manual accessible on the same page. An
introductory video of the tool is available on YouTube[36].
4.1 GUI Version
The UI version provides basic filtering and analysis facilities inline
after the experiment completes. Figure 2 gives a glimpse of the
Analysis Tab of the UI tool. One can sort results according to a
metric of choice, in increasing or decreasing order. Also, if one
needs to see how well or poorly a set of attributes performed,
that too can be achieved using the filtering options. For the first
time users, the GUI tool has an “experimental” feature called the
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Figure 3: Highest Classification Accuracy achieved for adult-iyengar for varying values of partition size
Autopilot. After loading a dataset, the Autopilot can be engaged
to find common values of the required input parameters for the
dataset. The Autopilot can be disengaged at any point in time if the
user feels like taking control of the settings.
4.2 CLI Version
The CLI version can be handy if one needs to try out a spectrum
of different partition sizes together. The CLI tool has switches to
provide details of the dataset, Classifier, Partition Size, Exceptions,
Expenses and several other settings. The advantage of the CLI tool
is that it can be invoked with different input values using a script
and be left to complete in the background (say over a weekend).
This could be particularly helpful for practitioners, as they can let
the data be collected over time, while they tend to other tasks.
4.3 Auxiliary Tools
The tool’s package has two auxiliary CLI tools called the Verifier
tool and the Recovery Tool at the user’s disposal.
The Verifier tool can be used for validating results produced by
the main tool. For instance, in cases where the dataset is too big to
conduct multiple Classification tasks practically, one may choose
to keep the Horizontal Expense to a fairly low value. This, however,
would reduce the confidence in the results, since they may have
overfitted a small portion of the large dataset. The Verifier tool
can be invoked to try a (sub)set of Attribute Sets reported to be
providing encouraging results, over the complete dataset, and ob-
serve the difference in the producedmetrices between the two cases.
The Recovery tool is an SoS application that can be invoked to
“resume” an abruptly stopped experiment due to mistakes (say by
pressing “Ctrl + C”) or problems (say power or network failures).
When an experiment running for several hours or days gets killed,
the Recovery tool can either dump the results already collected, or
resume the experiment from the last saved state.
5 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In order to evaluate our model, and test the tool over a real world
dataset, we conducted three sets of experiments over varying dataset
sizes. For some experiments, we used two classification techniques
as the learning mechanism - Naive Bayes and J48 Decision Trees.
For larger experiments, we choose only J48 due to computational
constraints. We now present the results of our experiments. The
first two datasets are standard datasets popularly used for reporting
results by researchers in the privacy domain. The third dataset is a
real world credit card fraud dataset, with additional challenges. The
tool was set throughout to use 5-fold cross-validation for producing
any result.
5.1 Truncated Adult dataset
The first objective of our experiments was to test if the hypothesis
can even be applied to a real world dataset. We needed a small
dataset to start with in order to quickly verify our model. To do this
we chose a subset of UCI Adult Dataset, which was originally used
by Iyengar[15]. Over the years, the setup was replicated by many
researchers ([8][19][18] etc.), and has become a de facto dataset
to report results for researchers working in the privacy domain.
We refer to this dataset as adult-iyengar. The dataset contained
only 8 attributes (and the class attribute) from the original dataset.
We skip the exact details of how the dataset was produced from
the original dataset as they are exactly the same as described by
Iyengar.
Figure 3 shows the results of the experiments. We intended to
see how the classification accuracy was affected, on selecting a
smaller subset of the dataset. For this, we varied the partition size
from 1 to n (in this case, n = 8) and invoked the tool in order to
find a partition, that provides accuracy within reasonable range of
the reference accuracy value (accuracy achieved when the entire
dataset is presented). It can be seen that the accuracy remains within
reasonable limits for partition sizes of 3 or more. This means that
choosing a smaller subset of attributes does not affect utility to a
great extent, while providing a higher level of privacy.
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Figure 4: Highest Classification Accuracy achieved for adult-complete for varying values of partition size
5.2 Complete Adult dataset
The adult-iyengar dataset can be considered a small, represen-
tative dataset, but it is certainly not exhaustive. Our next set of
experiments used the complete UCI Adult dataset[22]. First, we
ran the same profile of experiments as we did before, i.e. we var-
ied the values of partition size, and plotted the highest accuracy
achieved for each partition size. During this phase, we kept the
vertical and horizontal expense parameters at their full values, and
asked the tool to use dictionary order generation instead of ran-
dom generation for these experiments3. We refer to this dataset as
adult-complete. The dataset contained all the 14 attributes (and
the class attribute) of the original dataset. We removed any dupli-
cate or conflicting instances, as well as those with missing values
to obtain a clean dataset with 45,175 rows. The results of this set of
experiments are shown in Figure 4. As seen, the trend observed
for the experiments in Section 5.1 is reproduced on a larger dataset.
Beyond a certain partition size, the accuracy achieved is within a
fair range of that being achieved with the use of all attributes. This
provides more confidence that such a model can be used in a real
world scenario.
We then performed two other sets of experiments as well on
the adult-complete dataset. The experiments aimed at seeing
the impact of considering only a smaller set of attributes and/or
instances on the results of the tool. This is important because if
the results degrade significantly on application of our engineering
parameters, i.e. vertical and horizontal expense, then the tool cannot
be considered practical enough to be used in a real world setting.
The results are shown in Figure 5.
We changed the values of v and h to see if the trend is changed.
Figure 5(a) and 5(c) show the impact of varying the values of h,
essentially meaning inclusion of lesser number of rows per partition.
It can be seen that for both the classifiers, varying value of h, still
keeps the accuracy within reasonable limits of the corresponding
case, where all the rows were included in the partition. This shows
that reducing the size of the partitions did not have significant
3The same profile applied to the experiments in Section 5.1 as well.
impact on the model. This is reassuring because for large datasets,
keeping a relatively low value of h could be a necessity, but doing
so should not impact the overall results by much.
Lastly, we compared the accuracy readings reported by the tool
for different values of v, essentially meaning that certain partitions
were never tried by the tool, before reporting the highest accuracy
for that partition number. Figure 5(b) and 5(d) show the results of
the experiments. One thing to point out here is that reducing v for
partition size equal to n (14 in this case) is not applicable, since there
is only one partition to try in such cases. Clearly, the reduction of
vertical expense parameter did have some impact on the highest
accuracy, but the tool was still able to find a partition that could
provide accuracy within a reasonable range of the corresponding
experiment where all partitions were tried.
This provides confidence in cases where the total number of
partitions that can be formulated are too many. Trying out the
learning objective even over a small set of systematically chosen
partitions, can still provide a solution within practical limits for
use.
5.3 Credit Card Fraud dataset
In order to evaluate the model and the tool we built over a real world
dataset, we chose a credit card fraud dataset[3]. The dataset contains
anatomized credit card transactions by some European cardholders
in September 2013. We refer to this dataset as the credit-card
dataset. The dataset has already been sanitized into 28 attributes
(numbered V1 to V28) along with two more attributes, Amount and
Time, making a total of 30 attributes (plus the class attribute which
has binary values with 1 indicating a fraudulent transaction and 0
indicating otherwise). The dataset is highly unbalanced[10], which
is typical for a credit card fraud use-case. Out of a total of 284,807
transactions, only 492 are tagged as frauds. This places an additional
challenge since classification accuracy may no longer be a good
metric for the model to use. We therefore, looked at other metrics
that the tool generates in order to analyse the privacy concerns.
We now elaborate some of the used conventions:
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Figure 5: Highest Classification Accuracy achieved for adult-complete for varying values of partition size, vertical expense
and horizontal expense
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Attribute Set - U
Accuracy 99.88017 Time taken 1.09846
TP_1 0.52000 TP_0 0.99964
FP_1 0.00035 FP_0 0.48000
FN_1 0.48000 FN_0 0.00035
Precision_1 0.72222 Precision_0 0.99915
Recall_1 0.52000 Recall_0 0.99964
aROC_1 0.77595 aROC_0 0.77595
aPR_1 0.46787 aPR_0 0.99915
Table 1: Results for the credit-card for (put number = 1)
Attribute Set
{1, 2, 5, 8, 10,
11, 14, 15, 16,
17, 21, 25, 26,
28, 29}
{1, 4, 5, 7, 10,
11, 13, 14, 15,
16, 17, 21, 25,
29, 30}
{1, 2, 4, 5, 6,
7, 14, 17, 18,
19, 22, 27, 28,
29, 30}
{3, 4, 5, 6, 7,
8, 10, 14, 16,
17, 19, 26, 27,
28, 30}
{2, 5, 6, 10,
13, 14, 15, 16,
17, 19, 21, 22,
25, 26, 30}
Accuracy 99.95841 99.95136 99.95136 99.95523 99.95206
aROC_1 0.89360 0.87870 0.87207 0.88925 0.88382
aPR_1 0.76068 0.75866 0.75325 0.75057 0.75031
Table 2: Results for credit-card for (put number = 0)
• The tool numbered the attributes serially, in the order they are
present in the input (ARFF[2]) data file.
• The tool produced a CSV file as output, containing the following
fields for every classification task taken up in the experiment.
The values of i were 0 (the class of valid transactions) and 1 (the
class of fraudulent transactions).
Attribute set The set of attributes tried for the task
Time taken The time taken, in seconds, for the task to
complete
Accuracy The classification accuracy, in percentage,
achieved for the task
TP_i The True Positives Rate, on scale of 0 to 1,
for class i
FP_i The False Positives Rate, on scale of 0 to
1, for class i
FN_i The False Negatives Rate, on scale of 0 to
1, for class i
Precision_i The Precision, on scale of 0 to 1, for class i
Recall_i The Recall, on scale of 0 to 1, for class i
aROC_i The Area under the ROC Curve, on scale
of 0 to 1, for class i
aPR_i The Area under the PR Curve, on scale of
0 to 1, for class i
• The Time and Amount attributes are the first and last attributes in
the dataset, being referred to as Attribute# 1 and Attribute#
30 respectively. The attributes V1 to V28 are referred to as Attribute#
2 to Attribute# 29 respectively.
• Since we are more interested in the ability of the classification
task to be able to predict a fraudulent transaction, throughout,
we focus on the metrics collected for class 1 more than that for
class 0.
• Although the tool reports all the above metrics in the output
file, for the discussion, we focus on the area under PR curve,
area under ROC curve and the Accuracy as the main metrics
for analysis. In particular, for credit card fraud datasets, which
are often highly imbalanced in nature, using area under PR
curve could be a better option than area under ROC curve
or Accuracy[4]. Therefore, for discussions, we sort our results
in non-decreasing order, with aPR_1, aROC_1 and Accuracy
being the primary, secondary and tertiary criterion respectively.
Based on the trade-off model, we treat two cases as our reference
cases. The case where all attributes in the dataset are used, is the
case where we provide least weightage to privacy, and highest
weightage to utility. The exact opposite, is the case where we use
only one attribute from the dataset at a time and try to perform
the learning (in this case, perform a “classification” task using the
“J48” decision tree algorithm). We present the findings of these two
cases first to give an idea of the two extremes.
The data produced by the tool when invoked with put number =
-1 (partition size = 1) is shown in Table 3. The tool produced
values for all fields shown in Table 1, but as mentioned before, we
have shown only a fraction of overall data, that is relevant. Clearly,
the Accuracy is very high in all cases. This can be attributed to the
fact that since the fraudulent transactions are fairly low in number,
even a dumb predictor which predicts the same class all the time
(class 0), can still end up with very high Accuracy. For all other
cases, where the number of partitions tried were fairly high in
number, we followed the following procedure, to narrow down to
a small set of useful partitions, for a given put number:
(1) We first ran a longer, initial experiment, for the given put num-
ber, with small values of vertical and horizontal expenses (v
and h) to avoid high computational costs.
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Attribute Set
{1} {2} {3} {4} {5}
Accuracy 99.83083 99.82378 99.90131 99.85197 99.79558
aROC_1 0.48328 0.49995 0.47138 0.48092 0.48616
aPR_1 0.00162 0.00176 0.00092 0.00142 0.00197
Attribute Set
{6} {7} {8} {9} {10}
Accuracy 99.82378 99.86607 99.83083 99.85902 99.85197
aROC_1 0.49995 0.47890 0.48328 0.65941 0.79118
aPR_1 0.00176 0.00127 0.00162 0.06737 0.32891
Attribute Set
{11} {12} {13} {14} {15}
Accuracy 99.90836 99.92246 99.85197 99.92246 99.88017
aROC_1 0.75380 0.73174 0.48092 0.92222 0.46470
aPR_1 0.48456 0.41327 0.00142 0.57707 0.00112
Attribute Set
{16} {17} {18} {19} {20}
Accuracy 99.86607 99.85902 99.90131 99.83787 99.83787
aROC_1 0.75253 0.80987 0.64286 0.47388 0.47388
aPR_1 0.52713 0.44304 0.36259 0.00153 0.00153
Attribute Set
{21} {22} {23} {24} {25}
Accuracy 99.86607 99.83787 99.86607 99.83787 99.83083
aROC_1 0.47890 0.47388 0.47890 0.47388 0.48328
aPR_1 0.00127 0.00153 0.00127 0.00153 0.00162
Attribute Set
{26} {27} {28} {29} {30}
Accuracy 99.78853 99.85197 99.78149 99.78149 99.84492
aROC_1 0.49995 0.48092 0.48706 0.48706 0.47272
aPR_1 0.00211 0.00142 0.00213 0.00213 0.00147
Table 3: Results for credit-card for (put number = -1)
(2) We then sorted the collected results using sort criteria men-
tioned before. In order to validate these results over the com-
plete dataset, we chose a small set (in the order of 20 to 100) of
partitions which performed well in the initial experiment, and
ran our Verifier CLI tool (4.3) over these set of partitions, to
collect statistics over the complete dataset. This alleviated our
concerns of overfitting.
(3) We sorted the collected results again using the sort criteria
mentioned before. We then chose the top five partitions that
performed the best for the given put number.
The case which falls in the middle of our privacy model, is where
put number is chosen as 0. In this case, it mapped to a partition
size of 15 (out of 30). The top five results, obtained via the selection
procedure mentioned before are shown in Table 2. We must add
that we were able to come up with these sets of partitions, despite
the fact that we had to use fairly low values of v and h, in order to
keep the number of partitions to be tried, to a manageable number.
This provides a good confidence for using the tool, for cases where
computational resources are limited.
The cases where utility were given higher precedence over pri-
vacy were the ones where the put number was set to a value
“relatively” closer to 1 as compared to -1. For our experiments, we
chose 3 values for usage: 0.75, 0.5 and 0.25. They mapped to
partition size of 26, 22 and 19 respectively. Selected results
for these values are shown in Table 4. As discussed before, due
to lack of space, we are presenting only selected metrics, that too
for the top five partitions only. For theses cases, we use a compact
representation of a partition, where we show the indices of the
attributes that should be removed from the original set containing
all the attributes (U), instead of listing the attributes forming the
partition.
It can be seen that the partitions for these cases actually perform
even better than the case when we used the whole dataset. This
behaviour is typical for many feature selection activities, where
dropping least relevant features (which are essentially noise for the
learning process) can actually increase the efficiency of the learning
component.
The cases where privacy were given more importance than util-
ity, are the ones where we kept the put number below 0. The
values we chose were: -0.25, -0.5 and -0.75. They mapped to
partition size of 11, 8 and 4 respectively.
The top five results obtained via the selection procedure men-
tioned before are shown in Table 5. It can be seen that even dropping
to a value as low as -0.75 still provides us with some partitions
having decent values for the aPR_1 metric. For other two cases,
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(put number = 0.75)
Attribute Set
U -
{1, 3, 9, 13}
U -
{1, 2, 27, 28}
U -
{1, 4, 20, 23}
U -
{1, 2, 11, 27}
U -
{1, 2, 11, 28}
Accuracy 99.94607 99.94924 99.94431 99.94536 99.94572
aROC_1 0.87628 0.86957 0.85941 0.86722 0.87862
aPR_1 0.72319 0.72218 0.71789 0.71620 0.70504
(put number = 0.5)
Attribute Set
U -
{1, 4, 7, 12,
13, 15, 26, 30}
U -
{2, 7, 8, 9, 12,
19, 26, 27}
U -
{2, 6, 9, 12,
15, 25, 27, 28}
U -
{1, 2, 3, 5, 12,
19, 28, 30}
U -
{5, 13, 17, 23,
26, 27, 28, 30}
Accuracy 99.95030 99.95171 99.95277 99.95418 99.95136
aROC_1 0.89460 0.87972 0.88960 0.88286 0.90483
aPR_1 0.76495 0.75878 0.75770 0.75513 0.75484
(put number = 0.25)
Attribute Set
U -
{1, 3, 6, 7, 8,
11, 12, 15, 18,
19, 20}
U -
{1, 4, 6, 9, 15,
20, 21, 22, 23,
25, 28}
U -
{4, 5, 6, 9, 11,
12, 18, 20, 23,
28, 29}
U -
{1, 4, 5, 7, 10,
13, 16, 25, 26,
27, 29}
U -
{1, 2, 6, 9, 14,
20, 22, 23, 24,
27, 29}
Accuracy 99.95241 99.94536 99.95136 99.94184 99.94008
aROC_1 0.87247 0.86184 0.86064 0.85308 0.85677
aPR_1 0.73969 0.71005 0.70538 0.69688 0.69353
Table 4: Results for credit-card for (0 < put number < 1)
the values for the aPR_1 metric is actually as good as cases with
higher precedence to utility. This is a reminder to the fact that even
a privacy model which is simply based on the Collection limitation
and Data minimization practices[9], can still be applicable to real
world scenarios.
6 RELATEDWORK
We provide a brief overview of some of the work, that is relevant
to our own work in this section. We divide the work of our interest
into three categories (not necessarily exclusive).
First, there has been significant amount of work which can be
summed up as “attempts to build differentially private[11] versions
of certain machine learning techniques”. For instance, researchers
have worked on building differentially private versions of SVM[30],
linear and logistic regression[40], bayesian detection[21], random
forests[12], nearest neighbor classification[13] and even the rel-
atively recent deep learning methods[6]. Attempts to articulate
generic methods for doing so like “input perturbation” or “output
perturbation” have also been made[33]. From a practitioner’s view,
these works can only be of importance if they are converted into
(possibly free and open-source) software components, which can
be integrated with either an existing application, or be used as a
“black-box”. Unfortunately, majority of them are restricted to demo
applications only, and not as stable software components to be used
in production. There are some appreciable initiatives towards bridg-
ing this gap [25][24][29][16], but more of such efforts are required
for software providers to easily integrate privacy solutions in the
routine development cycle.
Second, substantial research has gone in achieving differential
privacy[11] in a practical setting by using the general concept
of anonymisation. The most popular examples are the usage of
techniques like “generalisation” and “suppression” to achieve the
notion of k-anonymity[32]. Although refinements of k-anonymity,
such as l-diversity [23] and t-closeness[20] have also been devel-
oped, it can be reasonable to say that k-anonymity still remains a
popular choice of researchers, with multiple versions of the same
(datafly[37], mondrian[19], incognito[18] etc.) available for practi-
cal usage under the UTD Anonymization Toolbox[5]. However,
a practical limitation of k-anonymity that we observed while trying
to use the toolbox is that implementing generalisation involves
a non trivial task of defining a “taxonomy tree” for nominal at-
tributes, so that the algorithm can move up in the tree to replace
specific values (say for an attribute called workclass) like “Local
Government”, “Federal Government” or “State Government” to a
more general value “Government”. 4 If two researchers select two
different ways to generalise values, we may end up with two differ-
ent, incomparable versions of the same dataset, both implementing
the same version of k-anonymity with same value of k. From a prac-
titioner’s view, providing these taxonomies manually will involve
the arduous process of agreement among the stakeholders.
4This particular example is quoted from the work by Iyengar [15].
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(put number = -0.25)
Attribute Set
{3, 7, 9, 10,
13, 14, 16, 17,
20, 21, 23}
{3, 4, 5, 10,
14, 15, 16, 17,
18, 23, 30}
{3, 4, 10, 14,
16, 17, 19, 23,
27, 29, 30}
{1, 4, 10, 14,
15, 16, 17, 19,
21, 24, 27}
{4, 5, 7, 9, 10,
14, 17, 21, 23,
25, 30}
Accuracy 99.95206 99.94889 99.95453 99.95136 99.94713
aROC_1 0.89486 0.88855 0.86523 0.90252 0.88281
aPR_1 0.75701 0.75214 0.75201 0.75118 0.75087
(put number = -0.5)
Attribute Set
{2, 5, 10, 11,
14, 15, 16, 30}
{8, 10, 12, 14,
20, 22, 24, 30}
{6, 7, 13, 14,
15, 20, 29, 30}
{3, 8, 11, 16,
17, 21, 26, 30}
{7, 11, 14, 16,
22, 24, 26, 29}
Accuracy 99.95065 99.94748 99.94290 99.93655 99.94360
aROC_1 0.87812 0.87601 0.88840 0.87209 0.88554
aPR_1 0.74206 0.72595 0.72089 0.70121 0.70012
(put number = -0.75)
Attribute Set
{17, 23, 24,
25}
{16, 17, 22,
28}
{16, 17, 20,
27}
{17, 19, 27,
29}
{17, 19, 20,
23}
Accuracy 99.92034 99.92492 99.91646 99.92351 99.92175
aROC_1 0.84071 0.86010 0.83149 0.82934 0.83944
aPR_1 0.62026 0.61283 0.60366 0.60100 0.59993
Table 5: Results for credit-card for (-1 < put number < 0)
Third, there are relatively recent works, which are precursor to
our work, that propose the idea of privacy-aware feature selection
[26][27][7][39][38][34]. Our work contrasts these works in either
one or both of the following ways. First, our model doesn’t expect
any prerequisites from the user in the fields of Probability, Statistics,
Information Theory etc. We do so by explaining the nuances of the
model using metrics that a practitioner may already be accustomed
to (such as “Classification Accuracy”), instead of defining a new
privacy metric that needs background reading. Second, we chose
to provide an engineering solution to the problem, by providing a
hands-on tool to analyze our model over any dataset, with no or
minimal pre-processing5. This too is important, because we intend
to provide a solution for a community which might be tempted
towards using a GUI based tool for analysing their dataset for
impacts of privacy preservation. To the best of our knowledge, our
work is the first to address these issues.
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this work, we presented the idea, prototype and initial results
related to a tool intended to aid software practitioners in making
crucial decisions about usage of user data in their applications. In
order to do so, we picked a fairly simple privacy model, which can
be appreciated without any background knowledge in Data Science.
We showed an evaluation of our model via the use of our tool
with experiments designed over the UCI Adult Dataset, a de-facto
benchmark for researchers in the field.We also showed how the tool
5Our tool provides one-click options to handle missing values or duplicate instances
in the input dataset, providing a safety net for algorithms that can’t work with them.
can be used in a real world scenario, by running various experiments
over a credit card fraud dataset containing actual transaction data
of some European cardholders.
The usual way of using this tool should be starting with a fairly
low value of put number (or partition size) and evaluate the
collected metrics for the given choice. If the results are within
“acceptable” range of utility (e.g. Accuracy in excess of 85% or
area under PR Curve in excess of 0.75), a suitable partition (or
set of partitions) shall be tried out in real world, and be used for
production. Otherwise, another experiment, with slightly higher
value of put number should be tried, and so on.
In future versions, we expect to make it more generic, by in-
cluding features such as support for Regression and Clustering
techniques as well. We plan to add support for choosing from a
wide range of learning objectives, as well as provide a mechanism
to link the tool to any learning component in general, via a stan-
dardized call-and-return interface.
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